CONJUNCTION, EXPLANATION AND RELEVANCE *

Robyn Carston

Universidad de Londres

Introduction

Since the work of Grice (1967) a particular division of labour between semantics and pragmatics has prevailed in the account of what is communicated by utterances of *and*-conjunctions such as those given in (1):

- (1) a. It's spring in England and it's autumn in New Zealand.
- b. He handed her the scalpel and she made the incision.
- c. We spent the day in town and I went to Harrods.
- d. She fed him poisoned stew and he died.
- e. I left the door open and the cat got in.

The word *and* is taken to be pretty well semantically empty; that is, it is taken to be the natural language equivalent of the truth-functional

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logical conjunction operator. Pragmatics takes care of the great variety of temporal, cause-consequence and other sorts of relations understood to hold between the states of affairs described, some of which come through in the so-called asymmetrical examples in (1b)-(1e). For instance, we understand the making of the incision in (1b) to have followed the handing over of the scalpel and an interval of a few seconds to have intervened; a quite different temporal relation is understood to hold between the states of affairs described in (1c), the event of going to Harrods interpreted as contained within the period of time spent in town. Different sorts of consequence relations are understood in (1d) and (1e): while the feeding of poisoned stew is a sufficient cause for death the leaving open of the door is just one of a range of factors contributing to the cat's getting in.

These relations are taken to be derived inferentially via an interaction of the decoded semantic content with general knowledge assumptions about the way things connect up and relate in the world, this interaction constrained by some general criterion or criteria of rational communicative behaviour.

The pragmatic account

It's not my purpose here to argue for the superiority of one pragmatic approach over another. Rather, I'll simply assume the relevance-theoretic framework and work within it. The fundamental idea here is that in processing an utterance a hearer is looking for an optimally relevant interpretation; that is, an interpretation that has the two properties given in (2):

- (2) An utterance, on a given interpretation, is *optimally relevant* iff:
 - (a) it achieves enough effects to be worth the hearer's attention;
 - (b) it puts the hearer to no gratuitous effort in achieving those effects.

(Wilson and Sperber, forthcoming)

Once the hearer has accessed an interpretation consistent with this expectation he looks no further but takes this to be the interpretation the speaker intended. An utterance, on a given interpretation is consistent with the presumption of optimal relevance if and only if the speaker could rationally have expected it to be optimally relevant to the hearer on that interpretation. The implications of this definition are fully discussed elsewhere¹ so I shall do no more here than give a brief outline of how this pragmatic criterion applies in the interpretation of one of the examples above.

As with any utterance there is a range of possible interpretations of (1d) which are compatible with the linguistically encoded, semantic, content. Two of these logical possibilities for (1d) are given in (3):

- (3) a. She fed him poisoned stew and as a result he died shortly after.
- b. She fed him poisoned stew and he died years later in a car crash.

Now, obviously, although these are both possible and consistent, the first one is overwhelmingly more likely to be recovered by the hearer, and to have been intended by the speaker, than the second one. Why is this? The intuitive answer is that well, it's just obvious, everyone knows that poison can cause death and that a person who knowingly feeds someone poison is most likely doing so with the intention of killing the person. The relevance-theoretic pragmatic account captures these intuitions without having to set up any special principles telling hearers to interpret in accordance with their standard stereotypic assumptions².

¹ See Sperber and Wilson (1986) and Wilson and Sperber (forthcoming).

² Levinson (1987) and others postulate a principle enjoining informational enrichment along stereotypic lines. However since such enrichment is by no means inevitable for all utterances they need other (conflicting) principles to account for other cases. The minimal effort clause of the relevance-based pragmatic criterion is able to account for when standard assumptions are used and when they are not. This is discussed a bit more fully in Carston (1990).

That we do so in this instance follows directly from the second part of the definition of optimal relevance, concerning the minimising of processing effort. One of the crucial factors contributing to the effort involved in deriving contextual effects is the accessing of contextual assumptions. In this particular example the very concepts encoded in the sentence give immediate access to these assumptions concerning the causal connection between poison and death, and the sort of malevolent purpose typically lying behind the piece of behaviour described; thereby (3a) is the first interpretation to come to mind. Then, assuming this has an adequate range of effects, no other possibility is considered. Note that the alternative given in (3b) might have just as wide a range of effects, or, conceivably, an even richer array, but the guarantee is not one of maximal effects; all the hearers can expect from speakers is that their utterances will have enough effects to justify the call on their attention. (3a) fulfils this expectation and doesn't put the hearer to any pointless effort, as would (3b) with its mention of poisoned stew which does not lead anywhere.

Conjunction versus juxtaposition

Now among the various arguments that have been put forward for favouring such a pragmatic account over a richer lexical semantics for *and* is the point that the very same temporal, consequential, etc, relations arise when the *and* is removed. Compare (4a, b, c) with their conjunctive equivalents in (1):

- (4) a. He handed her the scalpel. She made the incision.
- b. She fed him poisoned stew. He died.
- c. I left the door open. The cat got in.

We find, for instance, that (4a) communicates that he handed her the scalpel *before* she made the incision, just as (1b) does, and similarly for the other connections. So, the argument went, these imputed relations don't seem to have anything to do with the meaning of *and*.

Rather, they are the product of some quite general cognitive predisposition to forge certain connections and relations between states and events whenever it seems reasonable to do so; that is, rather than being arbitrary linguistic facts they are a matter for a cognitively-based pragmatics. This is a plausible, if not knock-down, argument, which together with a variety of other considerations, made a strong case for the pragmatic treatment. However, while it may be the case that all the relations communicable by an *and*-conjunction are still communicated when the *and* is removed, the converse does not seem to be the case. That is, there are relations that are communicated by juxtaposed sentences which apparently cannot be communicated when these sentences are conjoined by *and*. This was first pointed out by Herbert Clark with a pair of examples essentially the same as those given in (5):

- (5) a. John broke his leg. He slipped on a banana skin.
- b. John broke his leg and he slipped on a banana skin.

where, for (5a), it is quite possible, in fact more or less inevitable, that we understand the event of slipping on a banana skin as the cause of the event of leg-breaking; that is, the event mentioned second is understood as having caused and hence having preceded the event mentioned first. This does not seem to be possible for (5b) where the sentences are presented in the same order but conjoined with *and*. The same disparity arises between (6a) and (6b), and a range of other cases.

- (6) a. Mary fell asleep at work; she was exhausted.
- b. Mary fell asleep at work and she was exhausted.

In other words, there seem to be some fairly strong constraints on the sorts of relations that can be communicated as holding between states of affairs described by an *and*-conjunction.

These examples have been considered in an interesting paper by Bar-Lev & Palacas (1980). They pointed out that, whatever the source of

the meaning difference is, it cannot be to do with the order of the constituent clauses since this ordering is the same for the two members of each pair. So there's no possible resort here to any special pragmatic maxim of orderliness or sequentiality; in fact the (a) members of the pairs provide compelling evidence against the existence of any such maxims³. Bar-Lev & Palacas (1980, 141) go on to claim that the inescapable conclusion is that there is more to natural language *and* than simple truth-functionally and they propose that this extra element of meaning that *and* encodes is their relation of semantic command:

(7) *semantic command*:

The second conjunct (S'') is *not prior to* the first (S')
(chronologically or causally)

This idea is much better, in my view, than any of the other rich semantic treatments of *and* that have been offered from time to time, involving multiple features or senses⁴. However, it is not adequate. First, it amounts to nothing more than a descriptive statement of what we've just observed, which is that the 'backwards' causal and temporal relations possible for juxtaposed sentences are excluded when they're conjoined with *and*. It would be nice to know why this is the case. It just looks like the kind of fact that ought to be able to be explained rather than merely recorded. Second, and more important, there seems to be a range of counterexamples to this semantics for *and*. These fall into two classes. The first set concerns those for which a so-called 'backwards' causal relation is understood despite the presence of *and*. The second set involves different sorts of relationships altogether, having nothing to do with temporal or causal links between states of affairs. Examples of the first sort are given in (8) and (9):

³ This point is argued further in Carston (forthcoming a) and (forthcoming b) and in Wilson and Sperber (forthcoming).

⁴ Cohen (1971) is a major exponent of a rich univocal semantics for *and*. Posner (1980) provides an excellent overview of the "meaning-maximalist" position and compelling criticism against it.

(8) If the old king has died of a heart attack and a republic has been formed, and the latter event has caused the former, then Tom will be upset.

(9) A: Did Bill break the vase?

B: Well, the vase broke and Bill dropped it.

(example due to Larry Horn)

The point about (8) is that on the semantic command analysis the conjunctive antecedent of this conditional should have a contradictory feel to it since we are first being told that a cause-consequence relation between the second conjunct and the first is precluded, and then that just such a relation holds. There is of course no such feeling of inconsistency or tension; the encoded content of the *and* is just the minimal truth-functional connection which is perfectly compatible with the further specification of a backwards causal relation. Consider now the more interesting case of (9), focussing on B's reply to A's question. Here there is no linguistic specification of a backwards causal relation, as there is in (8), but the event of dropping the vase is readily understood as having preceded and caused the breaking of the vase. This should not be possible if *and* really does encode the property of *semantic command*. Certainly B's utterance is an indirect, round-about, sort of way of communicating the cause-consequence relation, requiring the hearer to do some extra inferential work in order to arrive at it, and no doubt giving rise to extra effects in the process, just as the definition of optimal relevance predicts. The example deserves further analysis but the important point for me here is that whatever the effects this conjunctive response has they are not derived via a contradiction, which is what the analysis of *and* in terms of semantic command would require.

An instance of the second sort of counterexample, in which temporal and cause-consequence relations are not at issue, is given in (10):

- (10) a. Language is rule-governed; it follows regular patterns.
- b. Language is rule-governed and it follows regular patterns.
- c. Language follows regular patterns and it is rule-governed.

In (10a) the second sentence is understood as a spelling out of, or elaboration on, the first one. This relationship seems to be another one which is precluded when the two sentences are conjoined with *and*, in whichever order, as in (10b) and (10c). These examples are cited by Bar-Lev & Palacas (1980, 144) later in the paper, which is odd since if their semantic command analysis makes any prediction about them it makes the wrong one. It predicts that the conjunction in (10b) should be able to be interpreted in the same way as the juxtaposed sentences since all that semantic command precludes is backwards *temporal* and *causal* relations. It seems clear then that this attempt to account for the constraints on the interpretation of conjunctions has to be abandoned; it is both too restrictive, since in some contexts backwards causal relations are possible, and not restrictive enough since it doesn't account for why the conjunction in (10b) cannot be interpreted in the same way as the non-conjoined clauses in (10a).

Explanation

If we do away with the semantic account we are back where we began with the problem of the non-equivalence of (5a) and (5b), (6a) and (6b), and, in addition, we now have the problem of (10a) and (10b). Let's focus for a moment on the juxtaposed, non-conjoined cases, (5a) and (6a): what's going on in these examples is that the second sentence is being understood as providing an **explanation** for the state of affairs described in the first. Now, an explanation of something standardly involves the citing of a cause or a reason for that thing; it's an answer to a 'why?' question or a 'how did it come to be so?' sort of question. What is interesting here is how dominant this sort of interpretation is for the juxtaposed cases.

- (11) a. Sue is happy today. She got/made a phone-call.
b. Sue is miserable today. She got/made a phone-call.
c. Max can't read; he's a linguist.
d. Max can't read and he's a linguist.

It is quite natural and immediate in interpreting (11a) to take the getting or making a phone-call, mentioned in the second sentence, to be the reason for Sue's feeling happy, though such a state of affairs is entirely neutral as regards any standard assumptions about cases of happiness. We are no less inclined to take it as explanatory of her misery when it is presented in the different juxtaposition in (11b). Even more surprising is (11c) where the immediate interpretative strategy seems to involve taking the property of being a linguist as explanatory of illiteracy, even if this is subsequently dismissed or taken as a joke. Compare this with the conjunctive counterpart in (11d) where the most accessible interpretation is one in which the conjuncts are understood as describing two contrasting facts about Max, an interpretation which is entirely in line with our standard assumptions about the way the properties relate to each other. Faced with these examples we might well feel that what needs accounting for is the dominance of this 'fact followed by explanation' type of interpretive strategy for the juxtaposed cases.⁵

In this paper, however, I'm just going to accept that this is so, that we are question-asking, explanation-seeking creatures, and return to the main issue here which is the preclusion of certain sorts of interpretation from *and*-conjunctions. Could it be that what it all comes down to is that the second conjunct cannot be interpreted as explanatory of the first? I think this is very nearly right. Stating the condition this way certainly covers the restriction on the interpretation of (5b) and (6b), but it also extends to (10b) and (10c). Although there is no issue of causality in

⁵ As with many of the issues and arguments in this working paper, this point is explored further in the longer paper, Carston (forthcoming b).

these cases, there is an issue of explanatoriness. The second clause in (10a), 'it follows regular patterns', is given as an explanation of the notion of 'rule-governedness'; it is a conceptual, or analytic explanation as opposed to a causal one, a distinction which can be brought out by the two different ways in which the 'why?' questions in (12) can be interpreted and answered:

(12) Why is John a bachelor?	Why is Mary so witty?
a. Because he doesn't like women.	a. She wants to impress us.
b. Because he's unmarried.	b. She says unexpected things.

John's dislike of women would enter into a causal explanation of his bachelorhood while his unmarriedness is part of the conceptual explanation of what it is for him to be a bachelor and the same distinction holds for the responses regarding Mary's wittiness. So asserting that the 'fact plus explanation' interpretation is impossible for conjunctions mops up not just the prohibited backwards causal relations, as in (5b) and (6b), which the semantic command analysis sought to preclude, but also cases such as (10) about which it was silent. Furthermore, it is not at odds with the interpretation of (8) or (9) as it does not absolutely forbid an interpretation in which a state of affairs described in the second conjunct is understood as being in a causal relation with that described in the first, as is the case with (9b) for instance. What it does do is account for the rarity of this sort of relation since understanding a speaker as giving a cause or a reason for something is, typically, to understand her as presenting an explanation of it.

Further evidence in favour of this as the crucial notion in accounting for the constraints on the conjunct relations come from a consideration of the class of so-called discourse connectives, that Blakemore (1987) has studied in some detail. These include expressions such as *so*, *therefore*, *moreover*, *after all* and *you see*. These form an interesting class of connectives since they do not affect the truth-conditional content of utterances in which they occur, unlike

such connectives as *because*, *while*, *before*, *in order that*, etc, but rather have the function of instructing the hearer how the proposition they introduce is to be processed. That is, they indicate that this proposition is to be placed in a certain inferential relation with some other, usually the one expressed by the immediately preceding utterance. Now what is of interest to us here is that some of these seem to be embeddable in an *and*-conjunction while others do not:

- (13) a. The road was icy and *so* she slipped.
- b. She's beautiful and *moreover* her father's rich.
- c. * She slipped and *you see* the road was icy.
- d. * He passed the French exam and *after all* he is a native speaker.
- e. * Language is rule-governed and *that is/in other words/you see/after all* it follows regular patterns.⁶

Of course, for all five cases, taking out the *and* to render them non-conjunctive makes them all equally acceptable. On Blakemore's analysis what distinguishes *after all* and *you see* from the others is that the sort of inferential role they indicate for the following proposition is one of being a premise in an argument which has the preceding proposition as conclusion. In other words, they indicate that the proposition they introduce is to be processed as a piece of evidence for the preceding one, or, equivalently, as explanatory of it. As she puts it: 'The proposition introduced by *you see* must be relevant as an explanation. That is, it is relevant as an answer to a question raised by the presentation of the first proposition...' (Blakemore, 1987, 123). It is in keeping with the observations already made that it is just these

⁶ As Buton-Roberts (forthcoming) notes, phrases such as *that is*, *in other words*, *for example*, are standard markers of apposition. As such it is to be expected that they would not occur in co-ordinate constructions. A fuller investigation of the issues here would require consideration of the different properties of co-ordination, subordination and apposition.

explanation-indicating connectives that should not embed comfortably in an *and*-conjunction.

So 'explanation' does seem to be the key notion here. Now someone inclined towards a semantic account might feel at this point that Bar-Lev and Palacas's notion of semantic command, in (7) above, could be simply and satisfactorily recast along these lines: the second conjunct cannot be interpreted as explanatory of the first. This is not a line I consider worth pursuing. It would be a very odd sort of semantic feature, but, more important, it would make the constraint on the interpretation of conjunctions seem to be an entirely arbitrary matter: words encode certain concepts and that's all there is to it. But it surely isn't an arbitrary fact about *and*-conjunctions that they cannot be interpreted in this way. I am going to suggest that it follows from a couple of very simple observations, one syntactic and the other pragmatic.

A new solution

An *and*-conjunction is a single syntactic unit; that is, it constitutes one the infinitely many sentences that the grammar generates. The juxtaposed sentences, on the other hand, are two syntactic units, two distinct outputs of the grammar. Second, the principle of relevance states that *every utterance carries a presumption of its own optimal relevance*⁷, which raises the question of what an utterance is; that is, of what the processing unit carrying this presumption is. The simplest assumption to make here surely is that an utterance unit is in some fairly direct correspondence with a grammatical unit. I think we should go along with this 'simplest assumption' unless we find some good reason

⁷ In fact, it states that "every act of ostensive communication" communicates the presumption of its own optimal relevance (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 158), but, of course, utterances are acts of ostensive communication.

not to. The claim then is that an *and*-conjunction constitutes a single utterance and so it carries the presumption of optimal relevance as a whole, while the juxtaposed clauses constitute two processing units each carrying the presumption individually.⁸

If this is right then the exclusion of the explanation interpretation from conjunctions follows directly: one conjunct cannot function as an explanation for the state of affairs described in the other, since an explanation is an answer to a 'why?' or 'how come?' question and, as Blakemore (1987, 123) has put it: 'questions and answers are by their very nature planned as separate utterances, each one satisfying the principle of relevance individually'. That is, the processing of the *and*-conjunction as a single pragmatic unit precludes the interpretation of the first conjunct as an independent unit which can raise implicit questions that are then answered in the second conjunct.

Now the way this is phrased, following Blakemore, is broader than it would be if the only sort of question-answer sequence precluded were the 'why?'/ 'because', explanatory sort, which we've concentrated on up to now. This broader picture seems justified when we consider two further examples, suggested to me by Deirdre Wilson:

- (14) a. I ate somewhere nice last week; I ate at Macdonald's.
 b. I ate somewhere nice last week and I ate at Macdonald's.
- (15) a. I met a great actress at the party; I met Vanessa
 Redgrave.
 b. I met a great actress at the party and I met Vanessa
 Redgrave.

The first clause of each of the juxtaposed cases in (14a) and (15a) is specifically designed to raise the question 'where?' and 'who?'

⁸ Blakemore (1987, 120) makes this claim also, though she gives it a rather different rationale.

respectively, which the second clause then answers. Again, conjoining these with *and* as in (14b) and (15b) knocks out that interpretation and causes a strikingly different one to come to mind. Notice that these differences between the (a) and (b) versions here could not be accounted for at all by the semantic analysis in terms of semantic command nor by any other semantic analysis for the matter. They follow, however, from the simple observations just given concerning the grammatical status of *and*-conjunctions and their processing as single utterance units, meeting the pragmatic criterion of consistency with the principle of relevance as a whole. It may be that questions of the 'who?', 'what?', 'where?', 'when?' sort have to be more obviously provoked, as they are in these cases, than does the ubiquitous 'why?' or 'how come?' explanation-requiring sort of question. Without doubt this sort of speculation needs greater consideration than I am giving it here, but the cheering point is that the simple account offered for examples (5), (6) and (10) carries over nicely to a range of examples with apparently quite different properties.

Last examples

- (16) a. Jim has a new girlfriend. He goes to New York every weekend.
b. Jim has a new girlfriend and he goes to New York every weekend.

There are various possible interpretations here, including a cause-consequence one, on which (16a) and (16b) have essentially the same interpretation, schematically 'P so Q'. But what I'm concerned with here are interpretations of the juxtaposition in (16a) which are not possible for the conjunction in (16b). On the basis of what we've seen so far the most obvious prediction would be that the second utterance in (16a) can function as an answer to a question raised by the first utterance, the most likely question being 'why?', while the conjunction in (16b) would not admit of such an interpretation. While the latter

preclusion seems to be correct it looks as if the prediction for (16a) is not borne out: it is not the case that Jim's going to New York every weekend is a cause or a reason for his having a girlfriend. Rather, it is his going to New York that gives the speaker *grounds for her belief* that Jim has a new girlfriend.

However, this appearance of a problem for the proposed analysis disappears once we recall a basic claim of relevance theory: an utterance may communicate several propositions explicitly. Sperber and Wilson (1986) introduced the notion of *explicature*, parallel to the Gricean concept of implicature:

- (17) A proposition communicated by an utterance is an *explicature* if it is either (a) the proposition expressed by the utterance (roughly, the Gricean *what is said*), or (b) a higher level proposition which results from embedding the proposition expressed under a speech act or propositional attitude description.

The motivation for this definition and comparisons with other ways of drawing the explicit/implicit distinction have been explored elsewhere⁹. What matters here is how this definition interacts with the claim made above that while juxtaposed sentences constitute two pragmatic units the conjunction is processed as a single unit. Returning to (16a), and assuming that it is used literally, the first utterance would have at least the following explicatures:

- (18) a. Jim has a new girlfriend.
b. The speaker believes that Jim has a new girlfriend.
c. The speaker is saying that Jim has a new girlfriend.

⁹ See Sperber and Wilson (1986, 182) and Wilson and Sperber (1990, 98) for slightly different definitions and for discussion of the concept of *explicature*. Some comparison with other views of explicitness is given in Sperber and Wilson (1986) and in Carston (1988) and (1990).

The prediction now is that the question 'why?' may be raised in reaction to any of these. In the case of (16a) it is clearly aimed at (18b), the higher level explicature, representing the speaker's propositional attitude, so that the second utterance of (16a) is given as an explanation of (18b) rather than of the proposition expressed, (18a). Naturally, this is not possible for (16b) since the explicatures given in (18) don't arise for it; the higher level explicatures of this utterance are those that are formed by embedding the complex conjoined proposition as a whole in the relevant propositional attitude or speech act description.

A similar treatment could be given to example (19), another one from Bar-Lev and Palacas (1980, 144-145):

- (19) a. These are his footprints; he's been here recently.
- b. These are his footprints and he's been here recently.

On one interpretation of (19a), not perhaps the most obvious one, the fact that the 'he' referred to has been here recently could be taken as the evidence on which the speaker bases her belief that these are 'his' footsteps (as opposed to anyone else's). This interpretation would directly parallel that of (16a) above and the account just given would carry over.

This, though, is not the meaning that Bar-Lev and Palacas have in mind: they take the second utterance in (19a) to be 'a conclusion stemming forward from' the first one. They are unable to account for why this is not possible for the conjunctive counterpart in (19b) since it is a forward-directed relationship and so quite different from the backwards causal and temporal cases that their *semantic command* definition rules out.

However, they elaborate on the situation a little by giving the acceptability judgements in (20) and they point out that the higher verb in (20c) and (20d) 'introduces the kind of causal relationship that allows *and*':

- (20) These are his footprints;
- a. * and he's been here recently.
 - b. ??and thus he's been here recently.
 - c. ? and I know he's been here recently.
 - d. and thus I know he's been here recently.

The concept of explicature sheds some light on what is going on here, I think. The higher level explicatures of the second utterance in (19a) would most likely include the following:

- (21) a. The speaker believes/knows that he's been here recently.
b. The speaker concludes that he's been here recently.

There is, then, in effect, a forward causal relation between the first utterance and the second in (19a), but one in which the consequence is a higher level explicature of the second utterance. This is not possible for the conjunction, which is a single utterance and so expresses a single proposition; that is, to put it somewhat crudely, attitudinal and speech act descriptions cannot get into the middle of the conjunction unit. This, then, accounts for the inadmissability of (20a) and (20b). Predictably, the conjunction becomes more acceptable when the propositional attitude description is linguistically encoded, hence part of the proposition expressed, as in (20c) and (20d). Questions remain, such as why the example is only completely okay when the cause-consequence connection is given linguistically, as in (20d), or, conversely, why (20c) is still a little uncomfortable despite the possibility of a pragmatically inferred cause-consequence enrichment, common enough for *and*-conjunction (recall the examples in (1)). I suspect that answering these questions would require some consideration of the nature of 'concluding' which I won't attempt here.

The final example comes again from Bar-Lev and Palacas (1980, 144):

- (22) a. Wars are breaking out all over; Champaign and Urbana
have begun having border skirmishes.

- b. Wars are breaking out all over and Champaign and Urbana have begun having border skirmishes.

The second utterance in (22a) is clearly a case of exemplification, rather than of explanation, of the fact given in the first utterance (see footnote 6). However, it is not really very remote from the examples already considered. Exemplification is a very common way of providing evidence to support a claim, or, equivalently, of giving a reason for believing something. Here the second utterance in (22a) provides evidence in support of the proposition expressed by the first utterance: it gives a reason for the speaker believing that wars are breaking out all over. This is not a possible relation between the states of affairs described in the conjuncts of (22b), but, again, that is just what our analysis predicts since an interpretation on which the two conjuncts would be required to function as two separate utterances is excluded.

Whether the picture drawn here turns out to be right in its detail (much of which has yet to be given), or even in essence, remains to be seen. Nevertheless, this pragmatic treatment opens up new directions in which to look for a truly explanatory account and it embraces a very wide range of the relevant data concerning the interpretive differences between conjunctions and their non-conjoined counterparts, two attributes which distinguish it from the semantic attempts, which have proved a dead end.

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