Cadiz and the Baltic.

Swedish merchant houses in Cadiz (1780-1800)

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During the whole of the C18th the trading relations between Spain and the Baltic were determined by the traditional rivalry between Spain and Great Britain, and also by the unequal alliance with France. Spain's wooing of the northern states was prompted by a special economic interest: the search for alliances to enable Spain to improve its balance of trade. But Spain's lack of weight in the political context of northern Europe meant that these attempts came to little, being classified by some historians as una política de gestos más que como un planteamiento posibilista.

During the C18th traffic and trade in the Baltic were dominated by the Dutch and English, with a progressive phasing out of the former by the latter towards the end of the century. The Dutch controlled the freight business and had dominated the capital and international payments markets since the C16th, but in the late C18th the effect of all the armed conflicts was to shift the centre of international credits to London and Hamburg. Thus, initially from Amsterdam and then from London and Hamburg, the goods of the north were distributed to the rest of Europe.

In just the same way as there was a change in the distribution centres, the nature of these goods imported from the north also underwent a change between the C16th and C17th. The demand in the

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1 PRADERLLS NADAL, J: Diplomacia y Comercio. La expansión consular española en el siglo XVIII, Alicante, 1992, page 449.
2 Ibidem, page 450.
C16th and C17th was mainly for raw materials and cereals, and Danzig was the hub of Baltic trade. In the C18th the demand switched to mining products and textile fibres, whereupon the most important Baltic ports became Stockholm and, above all, St. Petersburg.3

In general trade between Spain and the Baltic in the C18th was pretty low key. The information to hand on traffic and trade between both areas comes from statistical records of different origins.

In the first place there are the Oresund toll registers, which give figures on the traffic and trade between the Baltic and the North Sea, although these records have to be handled with due caution. They tell us the number of ships, the country where they were registered, destination and consignment ports, goods and amount carried.4 P. Jean­nin claims that the traffic through the Oresund represented 90% of the trade between western and eastern Europe, as the overland route carried far less traffic and was also considerably dearer. Furthermore the routes further to the west, Lille Baelt and Store Baelt, did not affect European traffic; the first was used for cabotage shipping and it would seem with little intent to defraud the authorities because it was easily controlled; the second was of some importance as the most direct westwards route towards Norway, Lübeck and Rostock, but its accounts, conserved only for the first half of the C18th,5 record not one ship coming from or heading for Spain.6

According to the figures offered by Zabala, the participation of Spanish ships in the Oresund traffic was very modest. Between 1700 and 1783 a total of 4,600 voyages from or to Spain was recorded, as against the 400,000 ships that sailed through the Sund in this same period; in other words only 1% of the trade directly affected Spain.7 By

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5 JEANNIN, P.; op. cit., page 68.
7 Ibidem, page 41.
comparison the Dutch, Scandinavians and English accounted for 75% of the total traffic. In general it can be said that the total Spanish share in the traffic through this strait never rose above 2.15%. It must be added, however, that there was a notable increase in this share throughout the century, especially after about 1760.

The consignment ports of the Spanish ships sailing through the Sund were above all those of the Andalusian area. According to Zabala’s figures 681 ships sailed from Andalusia, representing 44.5% of the total from Spain. The traffic from Andalusian ports would grow sharply from 1750 onwards and especially from 1770. Up to 1750 the percentage of ships from Andalusia was 32.3%, this proportion growing slightly during the seventies, whereby the 1,775 ships from Andalusia came to represent 37.3% of the total. Only five years later, however, at the start of the eighties, Andalusian ships sailing through the Sund represented 42% of Spanish ships. The Andalusian ports these ships had sailed from were Cadiz, Sanlucar, Malaga and Sevilla, although we cannot break down the individual importance of each one. The figures published by Zabala, however, suggest a very low proportion of Spanish ships from the Bay of Cadiz, which would indicate the charterers’ preference for foreign transporters, except for the seventies when Cadiz merchants preferred to use local ships. The fact that they used foreign transporters should come as no surprise, since the traffic between the Baltic and Spain was dominated until 1750 by the British and Scandinavians, while in the second half of the century the Dutch and the Scandinavians strengthened their hold on the traffic of Spanish goods through the Sund, due to the semi-permanent conflict between Spain and Britain at this time, rather than to any fall of the latter’s trade with the Baltic.

The destination ports of the trade from Spain fueron preferentemente Alemania, Rusia en la zona de Estonia, Letonia y Lituania, los puertos suecos y ocasionalmente los dane ses. Until 1770 Danzig and Stettin cornered 50.33% and 32%, respectively, of this Sund trade. Thereafter, the Russian ports increased their share considerably, especially St. Pe-
tersburg. Remaining destinies were shared out between Lübeck, Wismar, Bremen, Narva, Rostock, Copenhagen and some Swedish and Finnish ports that the table does not specify.

As regards the trade, the records drawn up by Spain and some states of the north, such as Sweden, throw some light on the exchanges. In the first place we have the figures published by Matilla Tascón on the state of Spain's balance of trade at the end of the C18th, specifically for the years 1792 and 1795, plus the highly interesting partial records for 1792 referring to the realm of Galicia. These records confirm trends observed in the Sund figures, i.e., a notable increase in the Spanish share in northern trade at the end of the century, with a parallel reduction in the trade gap with that area.

As for the trade with Sweden, the balance was favourable to the latter in 1792 and 1795. In 1792 the imports from there amounted to 9,747,407 "reales de vellón" (copper-silver alloy coins), while Spanish exports did not exceed 581,659 reales de vellón. Three years later trading relations between both states had intensified to Spain's benefit, as reflected in the trade balance for 1795. In this year imports from Sweden were estimated to be 4,750,960 reales de vellón, with Spanish exports of 1,556,688 reales, signifying an annual loss for Spain of 3,194,496, as compared with the 9,165,748 reales de vellón of 1792. Nonetheless this deficit was far smaller than Spain's trade gap with other states:

The Spanish trade balance of 1795 with:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>- 3,194,496 reales de vellón</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>- 6,686,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>- 15,709,322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>- 27,869,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>- 1,010,739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>- 9,126,763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamburg</td>
<td>+ 15,878,862</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


LaRUGGA, E. Memorias políticas y económicas sobre frutos, comercio, fábricas y minas de España, Madrid, 1799, vol. XLIV.
As for the goods involved, the dearth of records and the fragmentary nature of those that do exist have sufficed up to now only for a ranking of their relative importance.

Thus, the most important Spanish export to the Baltic area in terms of volume was salt. According to the Sund registers, imports of salt from Spain between 1700 and 1783 were of little significance, accounting for only 6.9% of Swedish salt imports, most of which came from Portugal, France and Italy.

Wine was another of the important goods, though Spanish exports rarely exceeded 2%, one of these rare exceptions being the year 1775 when wine from Spain represented 32.17%. The best known Spanish wines in the Baltic area were those from Malaga, Jerez, Pajarete and Catalunya.\textsuperscript{11} As for liquor, according to the vice consul in Russia, Blas de Mendizábal, \textit{se prefiere el de Francia al de España, porque este último es menos sabroso y tiene un olor más o menos desagradable}.\textsuperscript{12} Wine and liquor were the only products transported in Spanish ships. According to the vice consul about ten shipments a year arrived, but if the quality were increased the amount could be increased to twenty ships. As for the exporting of almonds, the same Mendizábal says that \textit{las de España son preferidas a las de otras partes, sin embargo, el precio bajo de las de Italia les perjudica a veces}.

In the period running from 1734 to 1783 the textile raw materials sent directly to the Sund from Spanish ports represented 12.67\% del total de las materias primas del ramo que hicieron la ruta este\textsuperscript{3} with a clear dominance of wool and a progressive growth of cotton.

Turning to colonial products, we find that the Sund registers lump together citric fruits and dried fruits with those that really did

\textsuperscript{11} A.H.N. Estado, leg. 4582. \textit{Los tres primeros (Malaga, Jerez and Pajarete) sirven únicamente de postre y, aunque es bastante general su uso, bastan 800 a 1.000 pipas para el consumo anual . . . En fin, aquí gustan de vinos que tengan cuerpo, pero que sean ligeras y gratos al paladar".}

\textsuperscript{12} Ibidem.

\textsuperscript{3} ZABALA, A.: op. cit. Page 50.
come from the colonies, so it is impossible to come at any sort of proportional ratio here. We know from the consular reports that the palos de tinte (logwood) came from Spanish possessions but got to the Baltic via England, Holland and Hamburg. The same went for sugar, especially the white sugar from Havana, which was highly prized, but which came through the port of Hamburg. Coffee came above all from Martinique, while sarsaparilla and other medicinal plants vienen por lo común de Cádiz.

With regard to Spanish imports from the northern countries the Sund registers show a much brighter picture. The main imports were wood and efectos navales (chandlery), cereals, textile raw materials of plant origin – mainly hemp and flax – wool, iron from Sweden and, at the end of the century, hides and wax, etc, from Russia. Before 1750 Spain imported very little Baltic wheat, but from this date onwards, and especially after 1779, there was a steady growth in supply from the north until it became bastante considerable. This “fairly considerable” should be taken with a pinch of salt, however, as Spanish imports, even in the years of greatest trade, never amounted to 20% of the total cereal trade.

Comparing Spanish records of the late C17th and total imports from the Sund under the heading of comestibles, especierías y licores (foodstuffs, spices and liquors), Zabala observes that in 1792 the Sund figure added up to 10.23% of the total, while only 26,663 “fanegas” of the 328,499 imported in 1795 came from the Sund.

The most important trade was without doubt wood and chandlery. Zabala estimates that roundabout the eighties nearly 10% of the wood exported through the Sund ended up in Spain, but it came mainly from Norway and Russia. According to the vice consul of

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14 Ibidem, page 60.
15 JOHNSEN, O.A.: “Les relations commerciales entre la Norvège et l’Espagne dans les temps modernes”, Revue Historique CLXV (1930). Bergen headed the list of exporting cities. In 1795 a total of 69 ships left this city bound for Spain and Portugal, and 83 ships in the next year for the Mediterranean. Most of these ships put into Spanish ports: Sanlúcar, Malaga, Valencia, Barcelona and others. Page 82.
Russia, the Royal Spanish Navy shipped out from Riga every year 10 shiploads of spars, and 15 shiploads of planks from St. Petersburg. Canvas, hemp and flax were usually Russian in origin and were bound for the naval dockyards and the Galician candle factories.

In general, on the basis of Zabala’s figures, we can conclude that Baltic trade was not of any great importance.

There was a general awareness at the time that trade with the northern states was poor and the balance of trade unfavourable for Spain. This fact was recorded by Spain’s diplomatic representatives in those states; their correspondence is in fact full of suggestions for boosting trade and cutting down the deficit, for carving Spain a niche among the powers that traded with the north. This concern for winning Spain a place on a par with trading powers like England and Holland was the outcome of the policy undertaken by Floridablanca and continued by Godoy, all based on the spadework done by Alberoni and Ripperdá in search of a northern alternative to the alliance between Madrid and Paris.

During the reign of Charles III Spain had attempted to sign a trading treaty with Russia, such as would guarantee it the same trading advantages as those already enjoyed by England and Holland. Afterwards, with Godoy, diplomatic policy continued along the same lines, managing to gain some customs advantages. In 1792, for example, Catherine II conceded a year-long duty-free status to all wine sent by the Hermandad de Viñeros de Málaga (Malaga Wine-Producers’s Association) to Kronstadt. The upshot was a increase in trade with Russia and a favourable balance for Spain that year.17

The hellbent attempt to improve Spain’s trade situation with the Baltic led some diplomatic representatives to write some interesting

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17 On 2 October 1792 the vice consul Felipe Amat wrote pointing out that Spanish imports in Kronstadt amounted to 8 or 9,000 roubles, comprising wine from Malaga, Catalunya and Sanlucar. Russian exports to Spain were wheat, planks, iron, canvas and hemp. Ibidem, page 49.
reports. Witness the report written by the vice consul in Russia, Blas de Mendizábal, sent to Madrid at the end of 1796.

Mendizábal’s main recommendation was for the trade to be as direct as possible, avoiding the intervention of foreign powers. Spain could thus offer salt, wine, liquor, oil, indigo, cochineal, dying woods and fabrics of wool and silk, while Russia would export wheat, flax, hemp, rigging, spars, planks, iron, wax, tallow, Moscow calfskin, hides, canvas, etc.

All these goods should be transported in Spanish ships. But the sheer distance involved made the freightage costs too high for Spanish captains who sailed there without cargo to take on freight at Russian ports. Mendizábal thus suggested that the ships should load up in Spain with salt and oranges, artículos que son de poco coste en España, to be sold in Russia to offset part of the freightage cost and the sailors’ maintenance and wages during the voyage. The navy would thus obtain the spars and planks they needed a la mitad de lo que ahora le cuestan, pues ahorraría los fletes que ahora le cuestan y que en estos artículos son tan elevados.

Another of the ways to boost trade and especially to cut costs was to favour the setting up of Spanish merchant houses in those parts, thus cutting out the English and Dutch middle men. To make the setting up of such establishments worthwhile it was of course necessary beforehand to obtain some advantages for Spanish traders in the Baltic. It would also be necessary to ban the entry into Spain, or at least penalise them with higher duties, of those northern products that came from ports other than los de su origen primitivo, se prohibiría, por tanto, a holandeses y hamburgueses surtir a España de estos productos, que nos venden muy caros y a veces adulterados. It would also be advantageous for the shipping contracts to be awarded to Spaniards, así el Ministerio de Marina debería hacer los asientos por 4 ó 5 años para que estas casas tomasen alguna consistencia, pudieran después renovarse de 2 en 2 años, o cada año, como lo hace el almirantazgo de Inglaterra. He therefore suggests to los Consulados de los puertos de España, a los Cinco Gremios Mayores de Madrid y a otros establecimientos públicos que pudieran contribuir a la planificación de las primeras casas españolas en los puertos del Báltico sin des-
prendirse para ello de fondos. Bastaría solamente que hiciesen la comandita de los sujetos que quisiesen establecer, esto es que saliesen como fiadores de sus operaciones por un cierto tiempo . . .

In sum, according to the report, trade with Russia in particular and the rest of the northern states in general developed less than it should due to the lack of customs and trading facilities.

Relations between Sweden and Spain in the last decade of the C18th also revolved around attempts to set up a trading treaty that would favour mutual interchanges. Sweden, after the war with Russia, had ended up in a dire financial situation, and naturally went in search of foreign creditors. France, in breach of its treaties, did not come to Sweden’s help, whereby, in the opinion of Ignacio M. Del Corral, Spanish envoy in Stockholm, Spain was in a fine position for setting up bridges with Sweden. Floridablanca, in contrast, was of the opinion that relations should rather centre on Russia, since he considered an economic pact with Sweden to be both useless and onerous for the Spanish exchequer.

Sweden’s need of funds led her to offer Spain some favourable terms, namely, a reduction of customs duties, thus giving Spanish goods such as wine and liquor the edge over the products of France and Portugal. Despite these Swedish offers, however, Spanish interest tilted definitively Russia’s way. Indeed, the trade figures of 1792 and 1795 show that exchanges between Russia and Spain were double the figure for Sweden. From Russia the main imports were flax and hemp and, to a lesser degree, wood, tar and tallow, whereas from

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* In 1792 imports and exports to Russia and Sweden were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>17,003,141</td>
<td>7,001,399 [sic]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>9,747,407</td>
<td>588,659</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1795 the deficit with Sweden was 3,194,496 “reales de vellón”, while with Russia the trade gap was 6,686,122 reales de vellón.

* In 1795 its value was 201,695 reales de vellón.

* In 1795 its value was 953,779 reales de vellón.
Sweden the main goods were tar, pitch, whale blubber and wood (handmasts, staves, stays for lateen sails, spar buoys, rods, boards, square wooden blocks).\textsuperscript{20}

Records available on trade with Sweden do not allow us to draw conclusions about the exchanges with Spain; whether they varied in line with the rest of the northern states or tended to fall in favour of Russia. One report on trade with Sweden\textsuperscript{24} published in London in 1776 tells us that Spain had no great dealings with Sweden until 1743, before which year Portugal had the better and greater trading relations. This report gives information on the trading balance between Spain and Sweden in the period 1738 to 1740 and in 1756, plus Swedish exports of various goods from Stockholm to Cadiz and Figueras, summed up in the following table.

**GOODS EXPORTED TO CADIZ AND FIGUERAS FROM THE PORT OF STOCKHOLM** (In shifp. 1 shifp = 400 lbs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MERCHANDISE</th>
<th>1766</th>
<th>1767</th>
<th>1768</th>
<th>1773</th>
<th>1774</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sheet iron</td>
<td>10 1/4</td>
<td>51 3/4</td>
<td>62 1/2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannons, anchors and iron balls</td>
<td>1,803</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron bars</td>
<td>9,657</td>
<td>8,585</td>
<td>4,842 1/2</td>
<td>2,199</td>
<td>2,745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nails</td>
<td>89 1/2</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>9 1/4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>53 1/2</td>
<td>142 1/4</td>
<td>320 1/2</td>
<td>231 3/4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper</td>
<td>120</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boards/planks</td>
<td>2,419</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>3,675</td>
<td>2,392</td>
<td>698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brass</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resin</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tar</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>1,193</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>257</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alum</td>
<td>10 1/2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{22} In 1795 its value was 3,352,958 reales de vellón.

\textsuperscript{23} In 1795 its value was 986,714 reales de vellón.

\textsuperscript{24} *Memoire pour servir à la connaissance des affaires politiques et économiques du Royaume de Suède jusqu'à la fin de 1775 énième année.* London 1776.
As can be seen, during the period running from 1766 to 1774 Swedish exports were pretty variable, although there is an obvious, across-the-board fall by the end of this period. The lack of correspondence between the units used here and end-of-the-century values prevents us from deciding whether there was an upward or downward trend in these exports.

We turn now to the figures available for 1796, based on the insurance policies taken out in Cadiz with northern states. On general lines the value of the cargoes insured was much higher on routes from the Baltic to Cadiz than the other way about. Similarly, the policies registered by the Cadiz market brokers for that year show only 2 insurance policies taken out for journeys to or from Swedish cities, while most insurance policies taken out for Baltic trade referred to routes to and from Russian cities (25 policies). In sum, only 1.6% of the value of the policies signed in Cadiz that year referred to trade between the Bay of Cadiz and the Baltic.

This set of rather unsystematic records is all we have to hand at the moment and prevents us from venturing conclusions about trade between Spain and Sweden, although we can say that a slight increase in Spanish trade with the Baltic is noted at the end of the century, without giving any specific figures.

SWEDISH MERCHANT HOUSES IN CADIZ, 1780 TO 1800

As Professor Manuel Bustos has already pointed out, the Swedish colony in Cadiz was fairly small, although it is possible that the number of non-residents was higher, to judge by the incessant traffic that arrived and made stopovers in Cadiz at the end of the C18th.25

25 In 1797 a total of 13 Swedish ships stopped over in Cadiz to be loaded with cargo before sailing off for the Americas. El correo mercantil de España y Las Indias, 1997, page 198.

Between 17 and 24 April of 1797 the Swedish brigantine Hope, captained by Abraham Rolin and carrying no cargo, put into Cadiz. Between 16 and 24 October, the Swedish brigantine Hope, captained by Matías Estruen, put in from Göteborg and Frederisha ven, carrying a cargo of wood.
This flow of people, goods and interests prompted Sweden to post two consular representatives, precisely in Cadiz, with jurisdiction over the Swedish nationals of the whole of Andalusia. From the eighties until 1799 Johan Jakob Gahn occupied the post of Cónsul general de Suecia en Cádiz y demás puertos de Andalucía, with Carl Christianin as vice consul. Nonetheless, the number of merchants settled in Cadiz was really low, probably for several reasons. Firstly, the states of the north, Sweden included, were slow to jump onto the bandwagon of international trade, and especially the trade between Cadiz and Spanish America. Furthermore, the Dutch, English and French stranglehold on European trading circuits balked any direct negotiation of Swedish merchant houses with Cadiz.

The second reason for the low number of Swedish traders in Cadiz could have been the custom of their merchant houses to trade through foreign middlemen, in particular by using English or Dutch merchant houses firmly entrenched in the main European trading centres, with a network of consolidated correspondents that would guarantee their payments. Indeed, according to K. Samuelson,26 many Swedish merchant houses had origins outside Sweden. Their founders were Frenchmen, Englishmen, Scotsmen or Germans, etc, who had settled in the main Swedish cities. These houses kept up a special relationship with the home country, so that those with an English or Dutch origin specialised in the exporting of wood and iron, while those with Baltic roots concentrated on the importing of grains, salt and textiles.

Thus, the Swedish houses might well have had an established preference for English or Dutch intermediaries before settling their own correspondents in Cadiz. It is also possible that the members of certain foreign trading houses set up in the Bay of Cadiz had, unbeknown to us, family links with Swedish merchants, which links they exploited in the running of their business.

Lastly, it should also be borne in mind that merchants chancing their arm in the Spain-Baltic run were taking on a high risk, with the

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corresponding high profits if successful. But given that the freight business in wood and iron called for a big capital investment, the Swedish merchants found themselves obliged to raise this capital by way of (short-term) credits abroad. The high interest rates of these loans considerably cut down the number of businessmen willing to take on this sort of highly speculative business.

Bearing in mind these premises, we have found in Cadiz at least three merchant houses with a turnover big enough to leave some record of their business. These are the firms Gahn y Cía, Rey y Brandenbourg and Hagstrom y Cía.

Gahn y Cía.

We do not exactly know when Gahn y Cía was set up, but it was already in full swing by the eighties. At this time it was made up by Johan Jakob Gahn, of Swedish nationality and the current general consul of Sweden and jefe y primer socio de la Casa, and Carl Christinin, also Swedish, plus a salesclerk called Gustav Celin. The company was a joint partnership whose partners were trading allies, and it had probably been set up with very little capital. As was usual with this sort of company, it had relatives posted in other cities, with whom commercial correspondence was kept up. We know of at least one relative of Johan Jakob Gahn, his cousin Henry Gahn, who ran a merchant house on the other side of the Atlantic in Philadelphia.

The economic importance of the firm Gahn y Cía is reflected en el hecho de que durante quince años estuvo a su cargo el aprovisionamiento de tablazón y arboladura a los tres arsenales de la marina española. The importing of chandlery and wood would in fact be one of its most im-

27 According to K. Samuelson the highest legal interest in Sweden was about 6%, but the real rates of the bills of exchange were higher.
28 Johan Jakob Gahn was son of the Swedish king’s treasurer.
portant commercial features, but not the only one. Being one of the few Swedish commercial firms in Cádiz, it also acted as shipping agent and correspondent for overseas houses, one of the most important being the Swedish firm Arfareds and sons, based in Göteborg.

First of all we will deal with its trading activity in ship chandlery. From 1781 Gahn y Cía was responsible for the provision of cobre para forro (sheathing copper) to the Royal Naval dockyard of Carraca. The scale and profits of this business must have grown with time, encouraging the company to broaden its offer to all ships arriving in the Bay. In 1784 it went into partnership with Valerio de Martino, of Puerto de Santa María, for setting up in the Channel of Trocadero some stores de compra y venta de géneros y pertrechos de carenas y armamento de navíos. In 1786 it was awarded the sublease for the provision of wood to the navy’s three dockyards, and this obliged it to increase the partnership it had formed in the Trocadero stores. Thus, in October 1787, the further incorporations were made of Bernabé Portillo, from the Cádiz business, plus the rigging factory that Valerio de Martino had in Puerto de Santa María.

The new company was initially set up to run until 1791, with a capital of 48,000 "pesos de a 15 reales de vellón", supplied by the three partners in equal shares, with the proviso that if it should prove necessary to contribute an additional quantity and any of the partners lacked the cash to do so, the other partners could supply his part at 8% annual interest. One of the most noteworthy clauses of the contract refers to the running of the rigging factory, since the company would foot the bill for all the hemp and tar necessary for making the rigging to be supplied to the Trocadero stores. We do not know the final result of

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32 A.H.P.C. Protocolos, Cádiz, nº 4286, f. 701-704.
In this first company Gahn y Cía provided two thirds of the capital while Valerio de Martino supplied the remaining third.
33 In charge of the rigging factory was Valerio de Martino, que cuidará con toda fidelidad y exactitud para conseguir la mayor perfección el referido D. Valerio, abonándosele el costo de manufactura y gastos a 50 reales de vellón por cada quintal de jarcia y 75 reales por cada quintal
the company. But it would seem that the business made a fair profit, judging from the decision to enlarge it in 1787, despite the fact that between 1785 and 1787 several accounts in promissory notes and deeds were pending payment, amounting to a value of 346,105 "reales de vellón". But we have found no proof in the records of its being extended beyond 1791. It may well be the case that the wars of this time and the economic difficulties the firm Gahn y Compañía was going through made the partners decide to wind it up.

When the sublease contract with Banco de San Carlos ran its term in 1786, the Swedish firm won the exclusive contract from the Navy
Ministry in 1794 for supplying the naval dockyards of Cadiz, Cartagena and El Ferrol with all spars, planking and wood needed by the Spanish navy up to 1803.35 The importance of the business, and the risks run by Gahn y Cía in undertaking it, can be seen from the fact that, in 1794, of the twenty Dutch ships chartered for transporting the planks from the Russian ports of Riga and St. Petersburg to the Spanish naval dockyards, only four made it to their destination. Thirteen of them, with a cargo of over 144,700 “pesos de cambio”, were seized by England on the grounds of its enmity with Holland.36

According to Gahn himself, the losses incurred by the company from such events amounted to a million and half reales por corretajes, premios de seguros, fletes, comisiones, devaluación de vales reales and diligencias judiciales, whereby, between 1795 and 1797, the company was set back by about three million reales.37

To offset these losses Johan Jakob Gahn persistently requested permission from the crown to ship 20,000 barrels of Philadelphia flour into the province of Caracas and Cumaná. This would be done in neutral ships and would redound to the advantage of the Spanish warships patrolling those coasts, providing them with flour al precio de paz.38 The deal was to be carried out jointly with his cousin Henry

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37 Ibidem page 296.
38 A.H.N. Estado, leg. 4634. The letter that Johan Jakob Gahn sent to the “Prince of Peace” on 15 September ran as follows:

"Habiendo tenido varios quebrantos, como le consta a VE, en el asiento que tengo a mi cargo de maderas del norte para la Real Armada, causados por los extraordinarios sucesos de la actual guerra marítima, como lo tengo justificado en el Ministerio de Marina, de que ha resultado el inevitable sacrificio de la mayor parte de mi caudal, y que S.M. movido de su Real piedad prometiese en real orden de 19 de abril de este año, resarcir y socorrerme según fuere justo y equitativo; y hallándome amenazado con nuevas pérdidas y dificultades, si el fuego de la guerra llegase de nuevo a extenderse más, he pensado en hallar un arbitrio por el cual me pudiese resultar algún beneficio, sin perjuicio o con ventaja del Erario y de la nación, poniéndome en estado de seguir las obligaciones del asiento para el mejor servicio de la Marina... con este objeto ofrezco y propongo a VE que si se rompiese la guerra con Inglaterra se me permita introducir en la provincia de Caracas y Cumaná veinte mil barriles de harina a la cantidad que VE gustase señalar, en buques neutrales, vendiéndolos en aquel vecindario según pudiere, y extrayendo su importe en frutos del país..."
Gahn who had a commercial establishment in Philadelphia. Finally, Diego Gardoqui advised that the contract not be awarded to him, on the grounds that he was a foreigner.

The firm Gahn y Cía was also shipping agent and correspondent of Swedish companies that carried out a brisk trade with Cadiz and the Mediterranean. It thus played a double role here, as may be gleaned from notarial records. In the first place it was an obligatory stopover for Swedish ships en route to the Mediterranean. These ships, which were heading for Italian ports with northern goods, made the return journey loaded up with Sicilian wheat, which they could then unload totally or partially in Cadiz in return for salt.39 But Cadiz could also be the destination port; it was often the case that Swedish ships sailed to the Bay with wood and chandlery consigned to the Cadiz firm, which ended up being sold there. The frequency of this type of transaction gives us food for thought about the market situation of Cadiz vessels. Although there are no comparative studies on this point, it is quite possible that the need of vessels to cover the American route led to a scarcity of ships. It is therefore also possible that this type of deal represented good business for the Swedish houses. The fact is that these companies were hard put to find freight traffic in Cadiz to double-up the profits they made on the outward journey with their cargoes of wood and chandlery, whereby they were often forced to sail cargo-less to European ports40 in search of more profitable cargoes. The alternative was to take on salt or other raw materials in Cadiz, but the freightage on these goods was low and hardly covered the

39 In 1781 the Swedish boat San Enrique, on its way back from Sicily with wheat to unload in Cadiz, sank in the port of Cadiz. The insurers and the ship’s agent managed to refloat it. Finally it was loaded up with salt for Amsterdam. A.H.P.C., Protocolos, Cadiz, nº 4280, f. 417.

In the same year Johan Jakob Gahn was expecting another 1,190-ton cargo of wheat from Sicily. On 9 March 1781 he took out a 18,000-peso comprehensive insurance policy on this cargo with several Cadiz companies who shared out the risks accordingly, the premium payable being fixed at 10%. A.H.P.C., Protocolos, Cadiz, nº 4280, f. 365.

40 Captain Swen Treyzen, a Muscovite who had sailed in his Brigantine La María from St. Petersburg and Edinburgh, was on the point of leaving Cadiz and sailing without cargo to Bordeaux in search of freight. A.H.P.C., Protocolos, Cadiz, nº 4288, f. 142.
costs of the return journey and crew. For this reason the most profitable solution might well be the sale of the vessel.\footnote{We have selected three examples of the eleven we have found between 1783 and 1785.

On 12 December 1783 Johan Jakob Gahn executed a sale deed for the Swedish ship called the \textit{Marstrand}, property of the Göteborg trading house \textit{Arfwidson and sons}, in favour of Juan Bautista Doperochegui, for the price of 20,000 “pesos escudos”. The ship changed its name to \textit{La Teresa}. A.H.P.C., Protocolos, Cadiz, n° 5935, f. 148.

On 19 April 1784 Johan Jakob Gahn, as agent of the Swedish packet called \textit{Resolution}, under the Captain Lars Fuet Man, executed a sale deed for said vessel, property of Jakob Fellman, resident and merchant of Brabstad in Sweden, in favour of Juan Bautista Doperochegui for 8,000 “pesos escudos”. From then on it went under the name of \textit{Santa Rosa}. A.H.P.C., Protocolos, Cadiz, n° 5935, f. 69.

On 28 May 1784 Carl Christianin, as agent of the Sweden vessel \textit{Peace}, property of Johan Roos, resident and merchant of Jacobstad in Sweden, executed a sale deed of said vessel in favour of Francisco Sierra, for the price of 10,000 “pesos escudos”. A.H.P.C., Protocolos Cadiz, n° 5935, f. 103.}

As general consul of Sweden, Johan Jakob Gahn was the official representative of the \textit{Swedish Royal East India Company in Cadiz}; as a merchant he was also its shipping agent. Like the other companies trading with the east, the \textit{Swedish East India Company}, en route for China, made an obligatory stopover in Cadiz where it loaded up with silver for its dealings in Asia. The silver withdrawals were authorised by the Banco de San Carlos, which had a monopoly on withdrawal rights at the time. Thus, in March 1785 the Swedish East India Company had requested the withdrawal of 180,000 “pesos fuertes”. The money was deposited in the house called \textit{Wulf, Morel y Cía}, in a separate fund. But it so happened that the bankruptcy of the \textit{Royal Asian Company of Trieste}, of which this company was commission agent and representative, meant that it found itself with a vast amount of money tied up in drafts, thus being bound to ask its beneficiaries to wait. Meanwhile the ship \textit{Prince Gustav}, owned by the \textit{Swedish East India Company}, put into Cadiz to take on board the 180,000 pesos deposited in \textit{Wulf, Morel y Cía}. This conundrum obliged the consul, Johan Jakob Gahn, to step in by requesting that this sum be duly issued, since it should have been set apart in a separate fund, as \textit{Wulf y Compañía} itself had de-
clared. After the creditors' meeting it was agreed that the funds be handed over under the personal responsibility of the consul, which decision was ratified by decision of the board of 30 March of that year. At the end of the same year the Swedish East India Company requested another withdrawal of silver, this time of 330,000 pesos fuertes for the expedition of its ship Gustav Adolf. These two requests by the Swedish East India Company coincided with one of the years of greatest silver shipments, and thus of silver withdrawals. In 1785 authorisation was given for 20,072,927 pesos to be shipped out, so the 510,000 requested by the Swedish company represented only 2.5% of the total withdrawn that year. The duty that the company had to pay the Exchequer for the silver shipment was fixed at 4%, although the Swedish chargé d'affaires in Madrid repeatedly slapped in complaints because the French had managed to cut this duty by 1%. The Swedish company finally achieved the same reduction and was compensated for the excess 1% it had been paying.

Our survey up to now seems to show that the main negotiating activity of Gahn y Cía was traffic and trade between the Baltic and the Mediterranean, especially the buying and selling of chandlery, not only in terms of its privileged relations with the Navy Ministry and the Royal Dockyards but also in its private dealings. This initial impression is borne out by the nature of the transactions carried out by the company in 1796, as recorded in the journals of the Cadiz market

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42 A.H.N., Estado, leg. 4634.
43 The Swedish East India Company complained that it was charged 4% customs duty, while the French East India Company paid only 3%. They therefore asked to be reimbursed the surplus 1%. A.H.N., Estado, leg. 4634.
44 On 7 September 1791 Sweden's extraordinary envoy, Baron Ehrensvärd, requested the right to freely extract 5,000 pesos fuertes a year from Cadiz to Tangiers to pay for the costs of his country's consul in that city. Ibidem.
45 TEDDE LORCA, P.: El Banco de San Carlos (1782-1829), Madrid 1988. The increase in the amount withdrawn in 1784 and 1785 responded to the massive arrival of silver after the supply hold ups in America during the war years. Pages 117-119.
46 According to the correspondence between Cabarrús and Floridablanca, quoted by P. Tedde, the contraband merchants, "metedores", charged 3% for smuggling the money on board the ships.
brokers. According to these records, Gahn y Cía applied for four six-
month loans to the value of 175,967 silver reales; drew 29 bills to a va-
lue of 1,716,098 silver reales and discounted another eight, thus earn-
ing 628,199 reales. It also signed 52 insurance policies valued at
508,438 silver reales and bought pitch and tar from Sweden, worth
87,191 silver reales.

The bills were divided pretty equally between Hamburg, London
and Madrid, the two first cities being centres of international credit.
Hamburg especially rendered indispensable services to Scandinavian
economies both in terms of communications and credits. Madrid, for
its part, was the national financial centre where official contracts we-
re paid.

Over half of the insurance policies taken out by the firm covered
routes between Sweden/Russia and Spain, especially Cadiz and the
three naval dockyards. Remaining voyages insured linked up Portu-
gal with the Baltic and North Africa, Italy with Cadiz, and Cadiz with
Amsterdam. In other words, although Gahn y Cía concentrated on its
business with the Spanish state, it also kept up thriving trading rela-
tions with Portugal, one of the main exporters of wine and salt to
Sweden and Russia, and with the North Africa and Italy, whence it
obtained, probably for its return journeys, wheat and dried fruits bound
for northern Europe.

The documents consulted show no evidence of any relation bet-
 tween Gahn y Cía and the American trade, barring the request to
supply flour to the provinces of Caracas and Cumaná. Nor does the
firm appear as moneylender to the other merchant houses.

Neither have we been able to unearth any information on the
winding up of the company. This is hardly surprising in view of the
fact that Johan Jakob Gahn, in his last will, executed on 2 October
1781, warned Carl Christianin to make no legal inventory.* We in fact
lose track of Johan Jakob Gahn in the last years of the century. The Al-
manak mercantil of 1800 includes Carl Christianin as the only diploma-

* A.H.P.C., Protocolos, Cadiz, n° 4280, f. 510-511.
tic representative in the Cadiz consulate. He might well have moved to Madrid at this time, since he had been requesting since 1792 to be posted there as General Consul of Sweden. Be that as it may, his testament includes the request that the company not be wound up on his death, and he urges his wife María Moya to continue with his partner Carl Christianin.

Rey y Brandembourg.

The firm of Rey y Brandembourg was set up by at least two partners, Guillaume Rey from Lyon in France and Johan Frederik Brandembourg, from Fredrikshald in Sweden. It seems that there were other partners, probably relatives of Guillaume Rey. For instance there are records of Pierre Rey who represented the company in some transactions in the early eighties, taking over control of the firm’s branch in Lyon. Nonetheless, the trade name chosen for the firm is a clear indication that Guillaume Rey and Johan Frederik Brandembourg were the main partners: los dos jefes de la casa de negocios.

We do not know when the company was set up, although we do know that it was up and running during the eighties and nineties of the C18th. And even though J.F. Brandembourg died in 1797, his wife, Enriqueta Butler, continued with her husband’s business, together with the other partner Guillaume Rey until well into the C19th. And if we know nothing about the setting up of the company, we know equally little about the amount of capital invested in its foundation. Available documentation suggests that it was a joint partnership, so the amount of capital invested cannot have been very high. In 1790, however, Guillaume Rey declared a capital of 21,800 “pesos escudos”; this suggests that the company, albeit in a modest way, was

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4 On 1 February 1786 he married María Moya, daughter of a merchant licenced in Cádiz, who died in Lima. María contributed a dowry worth 6,000 pesos and Johan Jakob Gahn’s contribution to the marriage was half of the capital he had at the time (end of 1786). A.H.P.C., Protocolos, Cádiz, nº 4285, F. 86-89.
doing quite well, despite the glut of bankruptcies in Cadiz business at the time.  
The different nationality of the partners, and the consequent links to French firms of Cadiz, Paris and Lyon, served to gear the firm in a certain direction and helps to explain a lot of the business it got involved in.

Like *Gahn y Cía*, Rey y Brandembourgo was not directly affected by the commercial difficulties that many Cadiz merchant houses were undergoing in the late eighties, although their activities are likely to have suffered at least a little. We note, for example, that the short-term credit transactions that the firm often intervened in between 1780 and 1788, whether bonds, promissory notes or bills of exchange, fell away sharply during the following period, from 1789 to 1795, disappearing from the notarial records in some years, such as 1793.  

The bankruptcies and temporary receiverships affecting Cadiz trade in 1789 and 1790, as we have already pointed out, did not affect any of the three Swedish firms dealt with here. On the contrary Rey y Brandembourgo subscribed 20,000 pesos to the attempt to bale out the floundering house of Manuel Rancés, which finally ended up declaring itself bankrupt on 31 March 1789.

France's declaration of war on Spain, on 7 May 1793, impinged on the firm's commercial progress. French citizens living on Spanish soil had been subject to a special vigilance by the government for the last two years. Among the foreigners involved in Cadiz trade, whom the war rendered non-residents, were members of the companies *Rey*  

49 A.H.P.C., Protocolos, Cadiz, n° 4,292, f. 117-125.  
50 Manuel Rancés, a Cadiz trader, was dragged down by the bankruptcy of another trader, Esteban Laborde, with whom he had a lot of money tied up. His own declaration of bankruptcy threatened to set off a chain reaction that boded ill for the city. To avoid this, several houses decided to get together to lend Rancés in drafts the sum he needed to meet his debts. The transaction involved shoring up Rancés' short-term payment capacity and thus saving the house from its doom. The subscribers thereto signed bills up to a value of 700,000 pesos, these including Rey y Brandembourgo. TEDDE, P.: Op. cit. Page 133.  
y Brandembourg and Gahn y Cía. The royal charters of 5 and 15 March, which ordered the extrañamiento de estos reinos de los nacionales franceses, then obliged the French partners of Rey y Brandembourg to leave Spain.

The commercial establishment run by Guillaume Rey and Johan Frederik Brandembourg, faithful to the trading methods of the Ancien Régime, had a finger in many pies: as we have already said it took part in financial activities, usually involving short-term loans, offering its services in the multilateral payments system to merchant houses of France and Hamburg. It also intervened in colonial trade, buying in Cadiz and reexporting the goods to North Europe and the Baltic, insuring them itself. Neither did it turn up its nose at the chandlery business, for which it had its own stores in the Channel of Trocadero.

As moneylender we find the firm in many notarial records as lender of relatively short-term credits, ranging from four to six months, generally given to merchants and above all to ship owners and masters who needed money for setting up their vessels.52 These bonds included several sales al fiado (on credit), which were mainly a result of deals made in the stores of the Channel of Trocadero. For example the Count of Reparaz, Juan Bautista Ustáriz, needed rigging, canvas and other gear, which the firm sold him from those it had almacenados en el caño del Trocadero. The Count offered to pay 99,231 "reales de vellón" of this sum when the vessel La Fe returned from El Callao, with the ship itself and the return-trip freight standing as security.53 On other occasions the loans were risk ventures, even though this type of financial instrument does not seem to have been widely used in Euro-

52 Juan Crisóstomo Palou, resident of Puerto de Santa María and owner and master of the frigate Santa Brígida, due to sail to the Port of Cartagena de Indias, asked Rey y Brandembourg for 6,000 silver reales, with repayment terms of six months and with the vessel standing as collateral. A.H.P.C., Protocolos, Cadiz, nº 4288, f. 220.

Under similar circumstances a loan was requested by Mariano Bernabé de Frías, who bought in the Trocadero stores a cable and hawser worth 8,050 silver reales for his ship San Pablo, binding himself to pay it back to Rey y Brandembourg at the end of 6 months. A.H.P.C., Protocolos, Cadiz, nº f. 318.
pean trade. Nonetheless in 1788 the company agreed to the request made by Captain Swen Treysen, a Russian living in Cadiz, skippering the Brigantine La Maria, which had come to the Bay from St. Petersburg and Edinburgh and wished to sail without cargo to Bourdeaux a buscar allí fletes. The captain guaranteed the loan by mortgaging his ship and the freights. The value of the credit was 6,271 silver reales, which would be returned after six months at an interest rate of 15%.54

Between the years 1795 and 1802 the firm Rey y Brandembourg was involved in legal action against the trading house Magón de Labalue of Paris for 26,126 doubloons from the value of 31 bills drawn by the latter against Sauch, Guillet y Cía of Cadiz. The case proceedings, dating back to 1796, seem to make it clear that Magon de Labalue drew 1,795 French Treasury bills on 10 and 12 December to the value of 66,666 doubloons, charged to the Cadiz merchant house Sahuc, Guillet y Cía, who duly accepted them. Of these same bills the aforementioned Magón endorsed 31 on 19 December in favour of Pontois and Sons of Amsterdam, worth 26,126 doubloons. In turn, Pontois and Sons sent these bills to Rey y Brandembourg to be placed at the disposal of Edvard Walekiers of Hamburg, who endorsed the second bills in favour of the same Rey y Brandembourg. The latter house was ordered not to pay the bills until 30 days after the deposit date of the 26,126 doubloons, in case of any payment breaches in the meantime. Meanwhile, however, Walkiers went bust. Knowing this, and on the pretext that the second letters had got lost, Magon and Pontois issued a third set of agreed bills, which were sent to Francisco Bustamente y Guerra, together with the deposit of 26,126 doubloons. This put Rey y Brandembourg in a tricky position as they ended up with the second bills, due for payment, but without the deposit, which was in the hands of Francisco Bustamente y Guerra. The result was that a large number of the Cadiz firm’s suppliers could not be paid in time. Perhaps the most important case, in terms of the amount of the debt, was that of Diego Duff, who attempted to cash several bills, to the value of 115,075 pesos, at Rey y

54 A.H.P.C., Protocolos, Cadiz, n° 4288, p. 142.
Brandembourg which the latter could not pay as they were still awaiting the provision of the 26,126 doubloons.\textsuperscript{55}

In the end, however, the firm came up trumps because their claim to the 26,126 doubloons finally prospered in 1802, whereby they were able to meet all their pending payments, including that of Diego Duff.

The firm \textit{Rey y Brandembourg} kept up intense dealings with the main European financial centres, especially Hamburg and London, where it issued most of the bills it drew in 1796 (to a total value of about 735,024 silver reales).

In this latter year, according to the brokerage records, \textit{Rey y Brandembourg} took a special interest in the purchase of colonial products, especially fine cochineal, indigo, cocoa and sugar, which it sold in the main European markets, especially Hamburg, Altona and the French ports of Bourdeaux and Marseilles. The firm’s entrepôt traffic avoided direct contact with the Baltic ports, especially those of Sweden and St. Petersburg, so its stores were supplied with ship’s goods from the stores of Hamburg, Altona or Amsterdam rather than directly from the Swedish or Russian ports.

We have found little information on the activities of the French-Swedish firm in Cadiz. As already pointed out, it continued trading after the death of Johan Frederik Brandembourg, in 1797, because his wife did not ask for the company to be wound up. Although we know that a good deal of its business continued into the C19th, we have not been able to ascertain when it was definitively wound up.

Alongside his merchant facet, Johan Frederik Brandembourg was also the official Russian consul in Cadiz from the early eighties until his death. This post, although endowed with social prestige, gave him few headaches, so his role as diplomatic representative of Russia in Cadiz is not of any great importance.\textsuperscript{56}

\textbf{Andrés Hagstrom y Cía.}

Andrés Hagstrom was a Swede running a family merchant house in Cadiz with no more support than his own capital and the help of

\textsuperscript{55} A.H.N., Estado, lego 5322, n° 75.
\textsuperscript{56} A.H.N., Estado, lego 5322.
one of his children, Joaquín, whom he considered to be an equal partner in the company business. Both of them se ejercitaban en negocios y dependencias del comercio marítimo y terrestre.\(^5\)

Records of the Cadiz activities are few and far between, restricted to the early eighties and the one-off year 1796, when many of their dealings were registered by the market brokers.

Various deeds of the eighties have come down to us, featuring Andrés Hagstrom as agent for shipments of wood and copper from the north, to be sold to the Naval Dockyards of Carraca.\(^6\)

The brokerage registers for 1796 record feverish activity by the firm in the importing of tar, wood, pitch and canvas from Sweden, which goods were sold to various Cadiz merchant houses. This flow of merchandise from the home country was secured by a host of insurance policies taken out with the various insurance companies based in Cadiz. In all A. Hagstrom took out 27 insurance policies for cargoes consigned to him, worth about 1,615,010 silver reales. The policies covered the following routes; firstly, those linking Cadiz to the Baltic ports of Stockholm, Lovisa, Fredrikshald and Göteborg;\(^7\) secondly the runs between Cadiz and the great re-exporting centres such as Hamburg and Amsterdam, and lastly those routes linking the Mediterranean ports of Cagliari or Naples to Cadiz and the north. The payment system, as revealed by the bills endorsed and drawn, evinces an almost exclusive preference for exchanges with Hamburg and for dealings with the German merchant houses of Cadiz, such as Böhl, hermanos y Cía, which endorsed seven of Andrés Hagstrom’s bills in 1796.

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\(^5\) A.H.P.C., Protocolos, Cadiz, nº 1698, f. 419-427.
\(^6\) A.H.P.C., Protocolos, Cadiz, nº 5935, f. 20, 128 and 201.
\(^7\) On 18 December 1795 Andrés Hagstrom took out a policy of 2,200 pesos to cover a crate of canvas from Sweden valued at about 4,200 pesos. The goods had been loaded onto the Swedish ship called La Isabel Carlotta in the Port of Stockholm, its destination port being Cadiz. But the ship sunk losing all its cargo. A.H.P.C., Protocolos, Cadiz, nº 935, f. 576-586.
We have now described, as far as existing records allow, the commercial and financial activity of the three Swedish merchant houses set up in Cadiz in the decisive years of the end of the C18th. They represent at least two different models, with the common feature of being set up as joint partnerships, of a family, personalised nature, which structure was in any case the rule in most Cadiz and Swedish companies at that time. This company structure determined the amount of capital invested, so we can hazard the guess that the funds of these companies were rather limited, obliging them to resort, at least initially, to loans from other merchant houses and to keep up a solid network of correspondents, especially in the European financial and trading centres, such as Amsterdam, but in particular Hamburg because of its Baltic connections.

The three examples studied here differ slightly in terms of their specific activities. Gahn y Cía centred its business on the supply of naval gear to the royal dockyards, dealing mainly in the importing of wood, copper, spars and other chandlery for the three naval dockyards. To overcome the setbacks that its ships suffered as a result of wars, the company had to take out loans occasionally from the Cadiz company Greppi Martiani y Cía, and to apply for new supply contracts from the crown.

The opposite model to this quasi specialisation strategy is given by the French-Swedish company Rey y Brandembourg, which made diversification the rule in its business. Its financial and commercial dealings ran practically the whole gamut of possible business. Thus, it bought and sold goods from the far east, sold naval gear and English textiles al fiado and lent money to skippers for their expeditions to America, etc. There is no doubt that this way of doing business chimed in better with usual Cadiz practices.

The commercial establishment run by A. Hagstrom had a foot in both of the above camps. Without going so far as the specialisation of Gahn y Cía, it did concentrate especially on the importing and selling.
of goods from the north, particularly chandlery, dealing directly with the supplying ports. But the records to hand are too sparse to allow us to venture many more details; the only thing we can say is that, although A. Hagstrom's way of doing business was similar to that of Gahn y Cía, the scale was much smaller.

At any rate the three merchant houses were trading during difficult years in Cadiz, when it was hard to break into a market such as the Cadiz one, evermore competitive as it was, with an ever greater range of products and an increasingly active role being played by contraband manufactured products; to make matters worse there was an ever increasing participation by new Spanish merchants. Despite all these drawbacks, however, these three Swedish houses did manage to carve themselves a niche in this market.
III SPAIN AND SWEDEN: ENCOUNTERS THROUGHOUT HISTORY

Commerce and Navigation between Spain and Sweden throughout history

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