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dc.contributor.authorBallesteros Pérez, Pablo 
dc.contributor.authorSkitmore, Martin
dc.contributor.authorCerezo Narváez, Alberto 
dc.contributor.authorOtero Mateo, Manuel 
dc.contributor.authorPastor Fernández, Andrés 
dc.contributor.otherIngeniería Mecánica y Diseño Industriales_ES
dc.dateinfo:eu-repo/date/embargoEnd/2024-02-27
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-11T13:29:14Z
dc.date.available2024-01-11T13:29:14Z
dc.date.issued2023-02-27
dc.identifier.issn0144–6193
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10498/29949
dc.description.abstractGates' (1967) bidding model was one of the earliest proposed for construction bidding. Its most celebrated formula allows for calculating the probability of any bidder submitting the lowest bid when competing against several known competitors. This model has been shown to outperform many recent bidding models. However, it also suffers from important limitations that keep it from being applied in wider contexts. In this paper, we overcome two of such limitations. First, we extend Gates’ model to calculate the probability of a bidder ending in any position other than the first (lowest). Second, we propose an approach for extrapolating the probabilities of all bidders underbidding each other, even in those situations of limited access to historical bidding information. Overcoming these limitations significantly enhances Gates’ model in two ways. First, it allows anticipating the probabilities of winning an auction in best value auctions where bidders who submitted a competitive but not necessarily the lowest bid can still win. Second, our extension allows applying Gates' formula in situations of incomplete information. This is especially interesting when some bidders have not met in previous auctions and there is no information from them individually underbidding each other.es_ES
dc.formatapplication/pdfes_ES
dc.language.isoenges_ES
dc.publisherRoutledgees_ES
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/*
dc.sourceConstruction Management and Economics - 2023, Vol.41 n.7 pp. 576–586es_ES
dc.subjectGateses_ES
dc.subjectbiddinges_ES
dc.subjectauctiones_ES
dc.subjecttenderinges_ES
dc.subjectprobabilityes_ES
dc.titleGates’ bidding model (revisited)es_ES
dc.typejournal articlees_ES
dc.rights.accessRightsopen accesses_ES
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/01446193.2023.2181980
dc.type.hasVersionAMes_ES


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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional
This work is under a Creative Commons License Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional