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dc.contributor.authorRodríguez Castro, Paula Isabel 
dc.contributor.authorRuiz Barbadillo, Emiliano 
dc.contributor.authorBiedma López, Estíbaliz 
dc.contributor.otherEconomía Financiera y Contabilidades_ES
dc.date.accessioned2025-01-21T16:50:26Z
dc.date.available2025-01-21T16:50:26Z
dc.date.issued2017-08-07
dc.identifier.issn2056-5127, 1012-8255
dc.identifier.issn10.1108/ARLA-11-2015-0307
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10498/34620
dc.description.abstractPurpose: The aim of this paper is to analyze whether the major international audit firms reach collusive agreements in Spain, in order to exercise market power and impose higher prices than those of competitors. According to traditional theory of oligopoly, the ability to achieve these agreements is dependent primarily on the high level of market concentration, so that multiple studies have analyzed the relationship between concentration and prices. However, the concentration has serious limitations to infer collusion and therefore the exercise of market power (Dedman and Lennox, 2009). Design/Methodology/Approach: Therefore, based on an alternative current of the theory of industrial organization, we use measures of industrial mobility as a measure of collusion or rivalry of firms in oligopolistic markets. Results: Our results reveal that international audit firms do not reach collusive agreements to limit competition between them. Social implications: According to the empirical evidence that we get, the measures taken by the regulatory bodies, in order to decentralize the market, would not be necessary nor efficient and they would have significant costs for the audit market (GAO, 2003, 2008, FRC, 2009; European Commission, 2010, Competition Commission, 2013). Originality/Value: In our knowledge, this is the first study to introduce mobility measures to explain market collusion and the exercise of market power in the audit market.es_ES
dc.formatapplication/pdfes_ES
dc.language.isoenges_ES
dc.publisherEmerald Publishing Limitedes_ES
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/*
dc.sourceAcademia Revista Latinoamericana de Administración - 2017, Vol. 30 No. 3, pp. 344-361.es_ES
dc.subjectAudites_ES
dc.subjectCollusiones_ES
dc.subjectMarket Poweres_ES
dc.subjectConcentrationes_ES
dc.subjectMobilityes_ES
dc.titleMARKET POWER AND AUDIT MARKET COLLUSION: THE SPANISH CASEes_ES
dc.title.alternativePoder de mercado y colusión en el mercado de auditoría: El caso Españoles_ES
dc.typejournal articlees_ES
dc.rights.accessRightsopen accesses_ES
dc.relation.projectID'info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/CICE-JA//P11-SEJ-8236/AND/ANALISIS EMPÍRICO DEL EFECTO DE LA ESTRUCTURA DE CONCENTRACIÓN DEL MERCADO DE AUDITORÍA EN LA CONDUCTA DE PRECIOS REALIZADAS POR LAS FIRMAS AUDITORASes_ES
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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional
This work is under a Creative Commons License Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional