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dc.contributor.authorÁlvarez del Cuvillo, Antonio 
dc.contributor.otherDerecho del Trabajo y de la Seguridad Sociales_ES
dc.date.accessioned2025-02-18T13:18:52Z
dc.date.available2025-02-18T13:18:52Z
dc.date.issued2024
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-031-75422-7 (físico)
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10498/35494
dc.description.abstractThe concept of discrimination appeared historically as a response to the ineffectiveness of the principle of formal equality to address certain systematic inequalities between human groups that are firmly rooted in our societies, such us the subordination of women. In this sense, it is connected with the idea of substantial equality that characterizes modern democracies. However, in its specific formulation, the anti-discrimination regulation tends to use the individualistic categories of our legal ideology, that are sometimes interpreted in a formalistic way by legal operators, turning victimized groups into abstract reasons for difference in treatment. Some feminist scholars have argued that the individualist notion of discrimination, linked to the Aristotelian notion of equality, is ineffective and in many cases even counterproductive to address the situation of oppression suffered by women. In order to reconstruct a group-based notion of sex discrimination it is necessary to provide a theory on the damage caused by discriminatory conduct, articulating individual and social harm. In this way many issues can be addressed, such as the justification of affirmative action measures, the possibility of reverse discrimination, the application of the concept of discrimination by association, the difference between discrimination and stigmatization or the question of whether men can bring claims of indirect discrimination to challenge the application of a criterion that harms them individually and women globally.es_ES
dc.formatapplication/pdfes_ES
dc.language.isoenges_ES
dc.publisherSpringeres_ES
dc.sourceEn Lacey, N., Jovanovic, M., Spaic. B., Zdravkovic, A. (Eds.) Reassesing Feminist Legal Theories. Springer, 2024. pp. 211-227.es_ES
dc.subjectdiscriminationes_ES
dc.subjectsex discriminationes_ES
dc.subjectsubstantial equalityes_ES
dc.subjectfeminist theoryes_ES
dc.subjectcollective harmes_ES
dc.subjectreverse discriminationes_ES
dc.subjectindirect discriminationes_ES
dc.titleIndividual and Collective Harm in Sex Discriminationes_ES
dc.typebook partes_ES
dc.rights.accessRightsclosed accesses_ES
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-031-75423-4
dc.type.hasVersionVoRes_ES


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