RT journal article
T1 Managerial Dominance and Audit Committee Independence in Spanish Corporate Governance
A1 Ruiz Barbadillo, Emiliano
A1 Biedma López, Estíbaliz
A1 Gómez Aguilar, María de las Nieves
A2 Economía Financiera y Contabilidad
K1 audit committee independence
K1 audit committee composition
K1 board of directors’ characteristics
K1 board size
K1 CEO duality
K1 management dominance
K1 management ownership
K1 Spanish corporate governance system
AB The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether the independence of audit committees is affected by the degree of control exerted by managers over the board of directors. Results from a sample of 75 listed Spanish companies show that the majority of firms that voluntarily adopted an audit committee between 1998 and 2001, made an effort to guarantee their independence from management. The degree of independence is shown to be determined by the proportion of inside directors on the board, the same person holding both the CEO and board chairperson positions, and the level of management ownership. These findings may have political implications because existing regulations do not limit the presence of inside directors on audit committees. The presence of inside directors may compromise effectiveness, turning audit committees into instruments of management to provide the appearance of monitoring.
PB Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.
SN 1385-3457
YR 2007
FD 2007-11-15
LK http://hdl.handle.net/10498/34504
UL http://hdl.handle.net/10498/34504
LA eng
DS Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Cádiz
RD 07-nov-2026