Shareholder Activism on Climate Change: Evolution, Determinants, and Consequences

Abstract

We study 944 shareholder proposals submitted to 343 U.S. frms on climate change issues during 2009–2022. We use logistic and two-stage regression to estimate the propensity for a frm to be targeted or subjected to a vote at the annual general meeting and, for voted proposals, the determinants of that vote. We also examine whether climate-related proposals afect investor returns and how they relate to frms’ future environmental performance and greenhouse gas emissions. Compared to a matched sample, we frst fnd that activists target larger, more carbon-intensive, and less R&D-active frms. Second, voting likelihood is higher for frms with repeated and operations-related proposals and lower pre-proposal environmental ratings. By contrast, disclosure-related proposals are likelier to be negotiated and withdrawn. Third, repeated and operationsrelated proposals receive higher votes in favor, whereas votes on carbon-intensive frms do not. Fourth, building on the theory that investors act as if they distinguish among the diferent shareholder proposals based on the expected cost to the frm, we fnd evidence to support this idea. We fnd that investors respond negatively to ex-ante costlier proposals, such as those that relate to emissions reduction and target carbon-intensive frms. Fifth, targets’ future environmental performance rating is almost twenty percent higher after a proposal than before compared to the matched sample, whereas emissions do not budge appreciably.